

Message Text

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APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTONJR.

S/S:MR. SHANKLE

PM:RERICSON

S/P - CAPT. PATTON

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 301768 TOSEC 320225

EXDIS - FOR SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS:PFOR, IS, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A)

SUBJECT:BRIEFING MEMORANDUM - YOUR MEETING WITH ISRAELI
DEFENSE MINISTER PERES MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 3:00 P.M.

1. PARTICIPANTS

U.S. ISRAEL

SECRETARY DEFENSE MINISTER PERES

SUGGESTED PARTICIPANTS: MINISTER BAR-ON
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON
MR. PETER RODMAN, NOTETAKER

2. CHECKLIST

-- PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING
AHEAD NEXT YEAR. ASK HOW THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS WILL BE
AFFECTED BY THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

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-- SOUTHERN LEBANON: URGE CONTINUED ISRAELI RESTRAINT.
WE UNDERSTAND THAT ISRAEL WOULD PREFER NO FURTHER SOUTHWARD

'OVEMENT OF NON-LEBANESE ARAB SECURITY FORCES, BUT WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THIS RISKS UNDERMINING SARKIS' PROGRAM FOR RESTORING SECURITY AND ESTABLISHING HIS AUTHORITY ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON AS WELL AS IN THE SOUTH. COULD ISRAEL NOT ACQUIESCE IN SARKIS' SENDING A LIMITED FORCE ONLY TO TYRE AND NABATIYA, IF WE OBTAINED HIS UNDERTAKING THAT IT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS HE COULD REPLACE IT WITH A LEBANESE FORCE? OR COULD ISRAEL LIVE WITH NON-SYRIAN ASF UNITS AT THOSE PLACES, IF SARKIS COULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM THIS WAY? THESE APPROACHES WOULD REDUCE TO SHORT-RANGE DIMENSIONS,OR ELIMINATE, ANY PROBLEM OF SYRIAN PRESENCE CLOSER TO THE BORDER

-- FY 1978 ASSISTANCE: INFORM PERES THAT THE FINAL LEVELS ARE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION BUT WILL IN ANY EVENT NOT APPROACH ISRAEL'S US DOLS 2.3 BILLION REQUEST (IF ISSUE RAISED).

-- F-16'S: REITERATE OUR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SELL F-16'S, BUT TELL PERES DECISIONS ON THE SPECIFICS WILL HAVE TO AWAIT THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION (IF ISSUE RAISED).

-- ARMS SALES: EXPLAIN THAT NEW DECISIONS ON FUTURE ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL WILL BE UP TO THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION (IF ISSUE RAISED).

-- RELEASE OF FY-77 FMS FINANCING: EXPLAIN ISRAEL STILL HAS SUBSTANTIAL UNUSED CREDITS. WE WILL PROVIDE FY-77 MONEY WHEN EXISTING CREDITS ARE DRAWN DOWN (IF ISSUE RAISED).

-- FMS AND MUNITIONS CONTROL LICENSES: TELL PERES THERE IS NO DELAY (EXCEPT NORMAL BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS) IN EITHER FMS OR EXPORT LICENSE PROCESSING WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW ITEMS INVOLVED IN ISRAELI SALES WHICH MAY VIOLATE OUR LAW OR POLICY RESTRICTIONS. WE ARE INVESTIGATING AND WILL BE CONSULTING SHORTLY WITH DINITZ (IF ISSUE RAISED).

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-- U.S. ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA: AFFIRM THAT THEY DO NOT THREATEN ISRAEL AND ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF AN IMPORTANT AND LONGSTANDING U.S. RELATIONSHIP (IF ISSUE RAISED).

3. SETTING

PERES HAS BEEN IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE DECEMBER 5 ON WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A PRIVATE FUND-RAISING VISIT. HE WILL BE COMING TO WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 12 AND DEPARTING FOR ISRAEL DIRECTLY ON DECEMBER 13. SECRETARY RUMSFELD WILL GIVE A DINNER FOR HIM ON DECEMBER 12 AND A WORKING LUNCH

ON DECEMBER 13. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED TO DEFENSE THAT RUMSFELD NOT ADDRESS THE F-16 QUESTION BUT, IF RAISED BY PERES, RESPOND ALONG THE LINES WE ARE RECOMMENDING TO YOU.

WE DO NOT KNOW IF PERES HAS ANYTHING SPECIFIC IN MIND TO TAKE UP WITH YOU, BUT WE SPECULATE HE MAY WANT TO GET SOME POLITICAL MILEAGE OUT OF HIS WASHINGTON VISIT TO SUPPORT HIS CANDIDACY FOR PRIME MINISTER. BEYOND THAT, HE PRESUMABLY ALSO WANTS TO DISCUSS CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES AND ISRAELI ARMS NEEDS.

4. BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

PERES' VISIT COMES AT A TIME OF RELATIVE QUIESCENCE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. OUR MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL ISSUE IS MANAGING ISRAEL'S SENSITIVITIES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON SO THAT THE AREA CAN BE STABILIZED WITHOUT RISK OF CONFRONTATION. AS YOU KNOW, PERES HAS A PREPONDERANT INFLUENCE OVER ISRAELI POLICY IN THIS AREA, AND WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO DISCUSS WITH HIM DIRECTLY POSSIBLE MEANS OF STABILIZING THE AREA WHILE MEETING ISRAEL'S DESIDERATA.

WE WOULD ALSO URGE THAT YOU USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE PERES VISIT TO CONVEY TO HIM YOUR VIEWS OF THE REQUIREMENTS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1977. OF THE LEADING ISRAELI FIGURES, PERES HAS PROVEN TO BE MOST OUTSPOKENLY SKEPTICAL OF ARAB INTENTIONS. HE HAS PUBLICLY DESCRIBED SADAT'S PEACE OVERTURES AS A PROPAGANDA

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GANDA EFFORT OF QUESTIONABLE SUBSTANCE--"PRESIDENT AL-SADAT IS SUGGESTING PEACE WITH ISRAEL WITHOUT PEACE."

PERES MAY USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS VISIT WITH YOU TO REINFORCE THE OVERTURES HE WILL PROBABLY MAKE TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD ON ARMS AND ASSISTANCE. IN ADDITION TO THE F-16, PERES MAY INFORMALLY TABLE A FURTHER ISRAELI ARMS REQUEST. SINCE THESE MATTERS REQUIRE LONG RANGE DECISIONS, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF THESE ITEMS WITH PERES ON THE BASIS THAT THE DECISIONS WILL APPROPRIATELY BE FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE.

5. ISSUES/TALKING POINTS

A. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

PERES HAS STATED THAT HE DETECTED LITTLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE CONTENT OF RECENT ARAB PRONOUNCEMENTS. PERES BELIEVES THAT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IS NOT POSSIBLE

AT THIS TIME AND THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO FOCUS ON PARTIAL
NEW AGREEMENTS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- ARAB EXPECTATIONS ARE HIGH THAT 1977 WILL BE A YEAR OF
MOVEMENT TOWARDS PEACE. THE IMPORTANT ARAB STATES, AS
NEVER BEFORE, ARE UNITED IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO SEEK

PEACE WITH ISRAEL. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ARAB INTEREST
IS GENUINE AND THAT THEIR OVERTURES PRESENT A REAL
OPPORTUNITY WHICH, IF ALLOWED TO LAPSE, MAY NOT BE REPEATED.

-- THERE ARE REAL RISKS IN PERMITTING THESE HIGH EXPECTA-
TIONS TO FOUNDER. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ISRAEL WOULD SEEK
TO TEST ARAB INTENTIONS SERIOUSLY.

-- THE POINT IS TO ENTER INTO A NEGOTIATING PROCESS, TO GET
THE PROCESS STARTED. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROBLEMS ARE
COMPLEX AND THAT THERE INEVITABLY ARE RISKS INVOLVED. BUT
I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT IT IS OUR FIRM JUDGMENT THAT
THE ARABS HAVE NEVER BEEN READIER TO ENTER INTO PEACE

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NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE RISKS OF FRUSTRATING THESE
EXPECTATIONS ARE GREATER THAN THOSE OF TESTING THEM.

B. LEBANON

THIS DISCUSSION WITH PERES OFFERS A FRESH OPPORTUNITY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS ANY ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR
POSITION OF OPPOSING THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY ARAB FORCES
INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH REGULARLY WITH
PRESIDENT SARKIS TO EXPLORE WITH HIM THE PROBLEM OF EN-
FORCING SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND TO GIVE HIM OUR
ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THE QUESTION. SARKIS
IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT, IF HE DOES NOT SEND FORCES
INTO THAT AREA SOON, HIS ENTIRE PACIFICATION PROGRAM
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WILL BE JEOPARDIZED.

-- WE DO NOT ENTIRELY UNDERSTAND WHY ISRAEL SO STRONGLY
OBJECTS TO THE MOVEMENT OF LIMITED UNITS TO TYRE AND
NABATIYA, STILL A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM THE BORDER.
IF YOU ARE DISTURBED ABOUT THE LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC IMPLI-
CATIONS OF A SYRIAN PRESENCE LASTING WELL INTO THE FUTURE,
WOULD NOT SYRIAN UNITS STATIONED THERE FOR A PERIOD OF
TWO OR THREE MONTHS, TO BE REPLACED BY THE FIRST LEBANESE

UNITS ORGANIZED, AVOID THIS PROBLEM, OR WOULD NOT NON-SYRIAN ASF UNITS AVOID IT. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SARKIS, BUT WE COULD PURSUE IT WITH HIM.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR AGAIN THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY ISRAELI UNILATERAL MOVES INTO SOUTH LEBANON. WE WOULD EXPECT TO BE CONSULTED IN ADVANCE IF

ISRAEL CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO TAKE ANY MILITARY STEPS.

C. FY 1978 ASSISTANCE

ISRAEL HAS REQUESTED US DOLS 2.3 BILLION IN ASSISTANCE

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FOR FY 1978. JERUSALEM IS NOW AWARE THAT OUR PROPOSAL IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW ITS REQUEST. PERES MAY WISH TO DISCUSS ISRAEL'S REQUEST, IF FOR NOTHING MORE THAN THE RECORD.

YOUR TALKING POINTS (IF ISSUE RAISED BY PERES)

-- WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED A LENGTHY PROCESS OF CAREFULLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY CONSIDERING ISRAEL'S REQUEST. WE WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO LEARN THAT ECONOMICALLY ISRAEL'S SITUATION HAS IMPROVED AND THAT OUR PREVIOUS ARMS AGREEMENTS WERE BEING READILY IMPLEMENTED AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS WELL CARED FOR.

-- IT WAS OUR JUDGMENT BASED ON THIS INTENSIVE ANALYSIS THAT ASSISTANCE ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS YEAR'S LEVELS WOULD SATISFACTORILY MEET ISRAEL'S NEEDS. WE ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE FINAL FIGURES AND WILL INFORM YOU AS SOON AS THE FINAL DETERMINATION IS MADE.

D. RELEASE OF FY-77 FMS FINANCING

PERES MAY RAISE WITH YOU ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO DRAW ON FY'77 CREDIT. WE ARE WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT TO THIS BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS (I.E., APPROXIMATELY U.S. 500 MILLION DOLS) OF UNUSED GUARANTEE CREDITS FROM PREVIOUS YEARS. THE ISRAELIS ARGUE THAT THIS 500 MILLION IS ALREADY COMMITTED FOR PAYMENT WITHIN THE NEXT WEEKS. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR FY'77 FUNDS NOW AND PREMATURE RELEASE WILL BE COSTLY TO THE U.S. TAXPAYER. OMB HAS HELD THIS VIEW MOST STRONGLY AND SAYS IT WILL NOT RELEASE THE FUNDS. JOE JORDAN IS LOOKING INTO THE PROBLEM WITH DEFENSE AND WILL BE SENDING YOU THE RESULTS OF HIS INVESTIGATIONS NEXT WEEK. MEANWHILE, I SUGGEST YOU RESTATE TO PERES OUR

OBJECTIONS TO THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL, BUT SAY THAT WE ARE
LOOKING INTO THE WHOLE MATTER AGAIN IN RESPONSE TO
ISRAELI REQUESTS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS (IF ISSUE RAISED BY PERES).

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-- THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ISRAEL USE AVAILABLE
CREDITS BEFORE EMBARKING ON NEW FINANCING.

-- I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE SIZEABLE BILLS NOW BEING
PROCESSED BY DEFENSE. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER,
THAT THE TOTAL SUM IS BELOW THE AMOUNT OF UNUSED
GUARANTEE CREDIT NOW AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL.

-- WE ARE LOOKING INTO THE MATTER AGAIN, HOWEVER, AND WILL
BE IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE.

E. F-16'S

AS YOU KNOW, THE ISRAELIS HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED THAT
WE SELL THEM 252 F-16'S, 200 OF WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO
CO-PRODUCE. THE PROBLEMS--FINANCING (ABOUT US DOLS 3
TO 5 BILLION, DEPENDING ON THE COMPONENTS TO BE INCLUDED),
AVAILABILITY, AND THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE OF CO-
PRODUCTION (WHICH INVOLVES, INTER ALIA, OUR NATO ALLIES)
WILL TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS TO ANALYZE. DECISIONS ON THIS
WEAPONS SYSTEM WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC EFFECTS SPANNING SEVERAL YEARS AND WOULD OF
COURSE INVOLVE THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION'S IMPLEMENTATION.
THE ISRAELIS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WHILE WE HAVE AGREED
IN PRINCIPLE TO THE SALE OF F-16'S, THE SPECIFIC DECI-
SIONS, INCLUDING CO-PRODUCTION, WILL NOT BE MADE BY THIS
ADMINISTRATION.

IN ADDITION TO THE F-16, IF PERES REMAINS TRUE TO FORM,
HE WILL USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS VISIT TO SOUND US OUT
ON A NEW TRANCHE OF MORE ROUTINE MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

YOUR TALKING POINTS (IF ISSUE RAISED BY PERES)

-- I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE WHAT WE HAVE PUBLICLY
STATED: THAT WE ARE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE SALE OF
THE F-16.

-- HOWEVER, THE REQUEST WILL HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY
THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, AND THEREFORE WE FEEL IT IS
APPROPRIATE THAT THAT ADMINISTRATION MAKE THE DECISIONS

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WITH WHICH IT WILL HAVE TO LIVE. IN FACT, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE REQUEST IS SO FAR-REACHING AND COMPLEX THAT ITS ANALYSIS ALONE MAY WELL EXTEND BEYOND JANUARY 20.

-- WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER ANY OTHER NEW ARMS REQUESTS-- AS WITH THE F-16--PROPERLY WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION. IT WILL BE THAT ADMINISTRATION THAT WILL HAVE TO FINANCE AND SUPPORT THOSE REQUESTS BEFORE CONGRESS.

F. FMS AND MUNITIONS CONTROL LICENSES; ISRAELI ARMS EXPORTS

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OUR MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 27, ALERTING YOU THAT WE ARE HOLDING CERTAIN EXPORT LICENSES FOR U.S COMPONENTS OF THE GABRIEL MISSILE WHICH ISRAEL HAS AGREED TO SELL TO SOUTH AFRICA. WE ARE IN THE FINAL STAGES OF OFFERING YOU RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS PROBLEM AND A RELATED ISRAELI FMS VIOLATION PROBLEM. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST NOT TO BROACH THIS DIFFICULT AND CONTENTIOUS ISSUE WITH PERES, BUT PERES MAY RAISE IT WITH YOU, IN WHICH CASE A PRELIMINARY INDICATION BY YOU THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THIS SPHERE WOULD BE USEFUL.

EXCEPT FOR FIVE GABRIEL-RELATED MUNITIONS CONTROL CASES, WE ARE NOT AS A MATTER OF POLICY HOLDING OR DELAYING THE FLOW OF EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL, SHOULD PERES EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT DELAYS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS (IF ISSUE RAISED BY PERES)

-- THERE IS NO PURPOSEFUL DELAY ON EITHER FMS OR MUNITION CONTROL ITEMS. WE ARE HOLDING A FEW ITEMS, LESS THAN FIVE, PENDING AN INVESTIGATION OF WHETHER THEIR SALE VIOLATES OUR POLICY RESTRICTIONS.

-- I HAVE BEEN BRIEFED VERY RECENTLY ON PROBLEMS WHICH ISRAEL'S EXISTING AND PROPOSED ARMS SALES RAISE FOR US. WE ARE NEARING COMPLETION OF A STUDY OF THESE PROBLEMS, AND I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR DINITZ ON THE

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DETAILS. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THIS MEETING WITH YOU TO GIVE YOU AN OVERVIEW OF THE MATTER.

-- AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE ASSISTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAEL'S DEFENSE INDUSTRIES AND UNDERSTAND THE OBJEC-

TIVES OF ISRAEL'S DEFENSE EXPORT PROGRAM. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO INTERFERE WITH ISRAEL'S PURSUIT OF LEGITIMATE AIMS IN THIS AREA.

-- NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE FOUND SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND A GENERAL TREND WHICH MAY CAUSE US CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY. OUR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION SUGGESTS THAT YOUR SALES TO HONDURAS OF FRENCH AIRCRAFT WITH U.S. ENGINES ARE IN VIOLATION OF YOUR UNDERTAKINGS TO US REGARDING THIRD-COUNTRY TRANSFERS. WE HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT THE GABRIEL MISSILE INCORPORATES SEVERAL IMPORTANT U.S. COMPONENTS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ANY SALES OF THIS WEAPON TO

COUNTRIES THAT WE EMBARGO WILL CREATE SEVERE POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR US AND ALSO, UNDER OUR LAWS, REQUIRE THAT WE STOP THE EXPORT OF THESE COMPONENTS TO ISRAEL.

-- WE HAVE ALSO BECOME AWARE OF A SUBSTANTIAL ISRAELI EXPORT PROMOTIONAL EFFORT TO SELL THE KFIR AIRCRAFT. AS YOU KNOW, IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL AND BINDING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROVISIONS, YOU HAVE GIVEN US A SPECIAL AND EXPLICIT UNDERTAKING TO OBTAIN OUR AGREEMENT BEFORE MAKING ANY SALES OF THIS AIRCRAFT. WHEN WE FIRST LEARNED OF ISRAEL'S SALES INTENTIONS LAST JUNE, WE REMINDED YOU OFFICIALLY OF YOUR UNDERTAKINGS. YET WE SEE INCREASING PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT ANY CONSULTATIONS WITH US.

-- THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER, AND WE WILL HAVE TO GO INTO IT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

G. ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA

DURING CLEMENTS' RECENT VISIT TO ISRAEL, PERES SHOWED A PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY TO U.S. ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ARMING OF SAUDI ARABIA MAY

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INVITE COMBINED ARAB PRESSURE FORCING SAUDI ARABIA TO PARTICIPATE IN A FUTURE WAR. CLEMENTS RESPONDED BY TELLING PERES THAT THE DELIVERY OF THE WEAPONS HE WAS REFERRING TO WAS YEARS AWAY AND THAT HIS THEORY WAS IN ANY EVENT PURE SPECULATION.

YOUR TALKING POINTS (IF ISSUE RAISED BY PERES)

-- IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA DETRACTS FROM RATHER THAN CONTRIBUTES TO ISRAEL'S DANGERS.

-- SAUDI ARABIA IS A BASTION FOR STABILITY IN THE AREA.

THE CLOSE AND IMPORTANT U.S. TIES WITH THAT COUNTRY ARE
IMPORTANT FACTORS IN MOVING THE MIDDLE EAST TOWARDS PEACE.

-- OUR ARMS RELATIONSHIP IS AN IMPORTANT EXPRESSION OF OUR
LONGSTANDING TIES TO SAUDI ARABIA, TIES WHICH ENABLE US TO
EXERT A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA AND TO PROTECT
ECONOMIC INTERESTS WHICH ARE VITALLY IMPORTANT TO US, TO
THE WESTERN WORLD, AND CONSEQUENTLY TO ISRAEL.

-- IF WE COULD NOT RESPOND TO SAUDI ARABIA'S LEGITIMATE
SECURITY NEEDS--AND THAT COUNTRY IS A VAST UNDERPOPULATED
AREA WITH UNCERTAIN BORDERS--IT WOULD ERODE OUR RELATION-
SHIP AND, WE BELIEVE, SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE POLITICAL
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE AREA.

6. DRAFTED:NEA/IAI:MDSTERNBERG:LLC

7. APPROVE:NEA:ALATHERTONJR.

8. CLEARANCES:PM - RAERICSON S/P - CAPT. PATTON
S/S:

ROBINSON

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